Radiation Protection Program Assessment Report

I. Executive Summary

The Compliance Assurance Office and technical specialist from WM/ER division, DOE AL, and DOE AAO conducted an assessment of the Pantex Radiation Protection Program during the period of July 1 through July 19, 1996.  This independent assessment was conducted at management's request to determine the effectiveness of the Radiation Protection Program in protecting the public, environment, and workers from radioactivity. 

The results of the assessment indicate the Pantex Plant Radiation Protection Program is effective.  Line level implementation problems are evident with recent revisions to controls on Radioactive material movements and sensitivity to Radiological Controls.  The program is improving and Pantex management has been proactive in correcting these problems, implementing the DOE Radcon Manual, and driving compliance with 10 CFR 835.

The assessment identified one strength, two findings and 10 weaknesses and 24 comments.  A brief description of the strength, findings, and weaknesses with responsible groups follow.  The details of the assessment items can be found in the body of this report.

Strength

The Radiation Safety Training activities including; Radiation Worker I & II, Radiation Safety Technician routine survey OJT, Drills, and practicals were noted to be effective.  In addition, the responses to an actual tritium alarm (spurious) and potentially damaged PIT tube were appropriate and effective in the facilities.

 

 

Findings

1.       The technical evaluations and control 
          of ALARA  improvement initiatives, 
          taken to reduce the number of  internally 
          monitored  personnel resulted in the 
          inappropriate cessation of bioassy 
          collections for personnel conducting 
          radiological waste compacting operations.  
          ( Environment,  Safety and Health)

2.      The posted Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 
         entry  requirement, to be a participant in the 
         internal monitoring dosimetry program, for 
         work in the Waste Compactor Facility were 
         not complied with by the workers entering and 
         assigned to the facilty.  (Applied Technology)

Weaknesses

1.      Radioactive Material Movement Tracking 
         Center  (RMMTC) activities did not always 
         result in effective documentation of, or 
         actions to verify receipt of moved 
         materials in a reasonable period of time.  
         ( Environment,  Safety and Health)

2.  The evaluation and justification for the reliance 
     on respirators vice engineered controls as the 
     primary worker exposure protection for portions 
     of the W79 Rocket Motor Removal Program 
     was not fully documented.  The requirements of 
     10CFR835 dictate that such work, which could 
     release radiological contaminates to the work 
     area atmosphere, be conducted with engineered 
     system controls whenever practical. 
     ( Environment, Safety and Health)

3.  The radiological and other hazardous material 
     characterizations for respirator filter cartridges 
     were inadequate to technically  justify handling 
     practices. ( Environment, Safety and Health)

4.  The MERF for the filter cartridge disposal drums 
     was inaccurate regarding items actually being 
     placed into the drums and no MERF existed for 
     the effluent from the Filter Mask Disinfectant 
     and Cleaning Unit in the Respirator Facility.  
     (Environment, Safety and Health)

5.  Various problems were noted in the review of 
     posted RWPs, radiation safety personnel 
     reviewed the issues raised and took 
     appropriate correct actions.  ( Environment, 
     Safety and Health)

6.  The formal documentation of the various 
     technical evaluations conducted by Radiation 
     Safety personnel requires improvement.  
     ( Environment, Safety and Health)

7.  The self-assessment program in Radiation 
     Protection department requires additional 
     management attention to ensure 
     completion and coorective actions.(ES&H)

8. The information from WPRRs, ORRs, and RAs is 
    not formally evaluated for recurring deficiencies 
    between the various reviews nor the results 
    provided to groups outside the specific evaluated 
    groups or involved organizations.  (Operations 
    Support)

9.  The preparations for a pending receipt of 
     Californium sources in building 12-56 were 
     not complete to ensure proper handling. 
     (Facility Engineering)

10.  The visitor dosimetry briefing process requires 
       improvement  to ensure briefs are completed 
       regarding site specific hazards and practices.  
       ( Environment, Safety and Health)

The assessment reviewed Radiation Protection Program practices throughout the plant and consisted primarily of evaluations of field observations of plant activities.  Personnel interviews, program documentation evaluation, and records reviews supported the assessment team conclusions.

II.  INTRODUCTION

Purpose and Scope

This Compliance Assurance Office (CAO) Assessment was conducted in response to a management request to evaluate the effectiveness of the Pantex Radiation Protection Program in establishing and implementing radiation protection standards which meet the DOE objective of ensuring the Public, Environment, and Workers are properly protected from radioactivity.

The assessment did not include any focused "ES&H target areas" as originally stated in the Assessment Planning Letter.  The Assessment Scope evaluated the Plant in the following Categories of Radiological Controls Programs:

*    Radiation Protection Program, 
      Records,and Documentation 
      (10 CFR 835 Subparts B & H)
*    Exposure Standards (10 CFR 835 
      Subparts C, I &N)
*    Workplace Radiological Controls 
       (10 CFR 835  Subparts E, F, G & 
       K)
*    Training (10 CFR 835 Subpart J)
*    Radioactive Materials Controls 
      (10 CFR 835  Subpart L)

Assessment Description and Methodology

The Assessment focused on the fundamental requirements related to DOE Radiation Protection Programs.  The assessment specifically addressed  the basic elements of an effective Radiation Protection Program as delineated in 10 CFR 835, Occupational Radiation Protection and DOE/EH-0256T, Radiological Control Manual, and established in MNL-RS-0001, Pantex Radiological Control Manual.

The Assessment review process included:

• Evaluation of the management and line organization activities which are conducted and established to protect the workers, public, and environment from exposure to ionizing radiation resulting from plant processes.
  
• Evaluation of compliance status and flowdown of requirements from applicable Regulatory and Department of Energy requirements, in Mason & Hanger directives, standards, manuals, and procedures.
  
• Documentation of objective information on the performance of plant activities to defined Performance Objectives and Criteria defined in the specified requirements, including identification of Strengths, Weaknesses, and Findings.

The areas focused on primarily involved radiological control activities which were related to facilities support, weapon operations, and weapons operation support.  The assessment involved the organizations in the plant that have actions related to the  Radiation  Protection Program.  In addition, storage and accountability of radioactive materials were included, primarily as the activities related to the ongoing production work.

Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADSs) developed from DOE requirements and Mason & Hanger operating standards were used to guide lines of inquiry.

The listed Strength, Findings, Weaknesses, and Comments represent the results of the assessment.  These results were based on evaluation of the information obtained during the assessment from:

*    Observations of operations, 
      activities, facilities and conditions
*    Documentation and Records 
      reviews
*    Formal and Field Interviews

Strengths, Findings, Weaknesses, Comments and Corrective Actions are defined below:

A strength is defined as a product, program, or activity that is especially effective and exceeds expectations of the customer or compliance status.  A strength is supported by clear and observable evidence of effectiveness. 

A finding is defined as a conclusion . . . .

 

1.  SUMMARY

Officials from the Compliance Assurance Office, WM/ER, DOE AL, and DOE AAO assessed Pantex's Radiation Protection Program from 1 July 1996 through 19 July 1996.  Pantex Management requested the assessment to measure the effectiveness of the Radiation Protection Program.  This program is designed to protect the public, the environment, and Pantex workers from an accidental release of radioactivity.

Assessors determined that Pantex's Radiation Protection Program is effective.  Officials identified some problems with procedures regulating the movement of radioactive materials and problems with the sensitivity of radiological controls.  More importantly, they found that Pantex continues to improve its safety program, specifically in the  areas where assessors  found problems, for example, in following the DOE Radcon Manual and in complying with document 10CFR835.

The assessment identified:

• 1 strength
• 2 findings
• 10 weaknesses
• 24 comments (not listed in this report)

Assessors made field observations of Radiation Protection Program practices throughout the Pantex plant.  They also interviewed workers and examined program evaluations and reviews.

1.1 Strengths

      Assessors found these radiation safety training 
      programs effective:

• radiation worker I & II;
• radiation safety technician survey and on-the-job training;
• safety drills;
• practical routines.

      The assessment team also found Pantex's response effective to 
      a simulated tritium alarm and possibly damaged pit tube.

1.2 Findings

1.2.1  Bioassy collection stopped on personnel doing 
          radiological waste compacting.  Changes in the 
          ALARA program, designed to reduce the number 
          of internally monitored personnel, caused the problem 
          (ESH: Environment, Safety and Health division).

1.2.2  Workers entering the waste compactor facility did 
           not complywith radiation work permit (RWP)  
          requirements.  These workers failed to participate in 
          the internal monitoring dosimetry program (Applied 
          Technology).

1.3 Weaknesses

1.3.1   Following the procedures of the radioactive material 
           movement tracking center (RMMTC) did not always 
           produce accurate records to verify that materials were 
           moved in a specified time (ESH).

1.3.2   During the W79 rocket motor removal program, ESH 
           personnel did not document that workers used   
           respirators.  Procedure 10CFR835 dictates that work, 
           possibly releasing radiological contaminates, must be 
           done with engineered system controls (including the use 
           of respirators) when practical.  Procedures specified by 
           10CFR835 must be followed by the W79 rocket motor  
            removal program (ESH). 

1.3.3   Respirator filter cartridges failed to adequately protect 
           workers from radiological and hazardous materials 
           during the procedure (ESH).

1.3.4   Items were inaccurately placed into disposal drums.   
           The MERF for filter cartridge disposal drums did not 
           accurately match what was placed into drums.  A 
           MERF did not exist for effluent taken from the filter 
           mask disinfectant and cleaning unit at the respirator 
           facility (ESH).

1.3.5   Radiation safety personnel corrected problems with  
           posted RWPs (ESH).

1.3.6   Radiation safety personnel must better document  
           their technical evaluations (ESH).

1.3.7   Management must monitor the radiation protection 
           department's self-assessment to ensure that corrective 
           actions are completed (ESH).

1.3.8   Operations Support must evaluate WPRRs, ORRs, 
           and RAs to identify recurring deficiencies, which must  
           be communicated to all agencies and groups likely to be 
           affected by the deficiency (Operations Support). 

1.3.9   Personnel in building 12-56 failed to adequately 
           prepare to receive a shipment of Californium (Facility 
           Engineering).

1.3.10  Instructions for visitor dosimetry procedures must be 
            improved to take account of specific hazards (ESH). 

 

 

 

 

2.  Purpose of the Assessment

     DOE mandates that Pantex protect the public, the environment,  
     and its workers from accidental exposure to radioactivity.  Pantex 
     relies on a Radiation Protection Program to comply with this mandate.   
     The management of Pantex requested this Compliance Assurance 
     Office (CAO) assessment to determine how well the Radiation 
     Protection Program works.

3.  SCOPE of THE ASSESSMENT

     The assessment planning letter specified that ESH target areas 
     would not be examined.  It asked CAO to evaluate these 
     categories of the radiological control program specified by 
     docuement 10CFR835: 

4.  METHODS OF ASSESSMENT

     Assessors relied on DOE radiation protection programs defined by these 
     documents

     Assessors examined radiological controls for support facilities, 
     weapons operations, and weapons operation support.  They 
     studied those Pantex organizations most directly related to the
      radiation protection program.  They also studied ongoing 
     production work, including the storage and accountability of 
     radioactive materials. Assessors followed criteria review and 
     approach documents (CRADs) developed from DOE requirements 
     and Mason & Hanger operating standards.

     Strengths, findings, weaknesses, and comments (sections 1.1, 1.2, 
     1.3) result from an examination of:

      4.4  Observations of facilities, conditions, operations, and activities 
             at Pantex;
      4.5  Documents and records;
      4.6  Formal interviews and informal field interviews

5.  TARGETS OF ASSESSMENT

      5.1   Management, who ensures compliance with Pantex's 
              radiation protection programs.
      5.2   Procedures used to protect Pantex workers, the public, 
              and the environment from accidental exposure to ionizing 
              radiation.
      5.3   Compliance with regulatory and DOE requirements specified 
              by Mason & Hanger directives, standards, manuals, and 
              procedures.
      5.4   The accuracy and thoroughness of efforts to document plant 
              procedures specified by performance objectives and criteria, 
              including those defined above in sections 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 
              (Strength, Weaknesses, Findings).

6.  DEFINITIONS 

     6.1  Strength: an especially effective product, program, or activity 
            that exceeds expectations or compliance standards. A strength 
            is supported by objective evidence.
     6.2  Finding: a conclusion . . . .