A research consortium of
1. The Report is a reasonably comprehensive review of disposition
options as seen by the two sides together with assessments of
pros and cons of each again as seen by the two sides.
2. Most notable, however, is the absence of any concrete recommendations
as to the means by which agreed further work and investigation
can be effected. As was clearly demonstrated at the recent meeting
of the joint study group in St. Petersburg, decisions or conclusions
reached at the technical level must be ratified and moved forward
at the political decision-making level. This was not accomplished
at St. Petersburg. Yet there is no reference to the need for
a mechanism to accomplish this either in the report summary or
its brief Executive Summary. This deficiency should be rectified
in the conclusion of the document with an affirmative statement
as to the need for such a decision making mechanism. Both sides
should agree as to the need for an intergovernmental body to give
effect to this recommendation. An Executive Agreement or a treaty
should confirm agreements reached and by involving the legislative
process convey a measure of permanence to them.
3. It was noted that Russia has yet to declare its surplus weapons
plutonium. This is in contrast to the frequently repeated understanding
that there will be essential equivalence in the U.S. and Russian
declarations (i.e. about 50 tons each). This should be vigorously
pursued consistent with the basic purpose to get Russia to dispose
of its weapons material.
4. Executive Summary, Page 2
Given the long time scale of the disposition process and the likelihood
that much of the retired plutonium will remain in pit form for
many years, bilateral monitoring during the period is essential
to assure both countries that the Pu has really been and remains
demilitarized.
5. Summary, Page 17
No mention is made of the possible transfer of the Siemens MOX
plant to Russia. If this was considered by the Joint Group it
should be mentioned. If it was not considered, it should have
been.
6. Summary, Page 25
The characterization of weapons-grade plutonium as "somewhat
more attractive for use in weapons" is a serious understatement
in the context of national retrieval and reuse. This characterization
is acceptable for "resistance to (subnational) theft and
diversion," but the evidence is overwhelming that, for the
U.S. and, in all probability, Russia, reactor-grade plutonium
is much less attractive for use in weapons. The sentence
should be amended along the lines of: "Given the fact that
the U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons technology and stockpiles
are based on weapons-grade plutonium, reactor-grade plutonium
would be much less attractive for use in any weapons programs
than plutonium of weapons-grade."
7. Summary, Page 26
The section entitled "Geologic Disposal" is established
as a coordinate section of the report with the reactor and immobilization
options. This is misleading and inaccurate. Conversion to the
"spent fuel standard" by either the reactor or immobilization
options is not dependent on geologic disposal. It is,
misleading to characterize geologic disposal as the "final
and concluding phase" in all disposition options. Moreover,
there is no mention of the fact that geological disposal, even
if accomplished, would be followed by 50 or more years of intentional
accessibility to provide assurance of repository performance.
This is an important fact that should be made clear.
8. Specific text changes: