A research consortium of The Texas A&M University System and The University of Texas System

Senior Technical Review Group Report May 1996

Observations and Recommendations on Interim Storage

Tours and briefings of the Pantex site were conducted by DOE and Mason & Hanger representatives. Following these tours, DOE headquarters representatives made extensive presentations and participated in discussions as to DOE's overall planning for storage and transportation of Plutonium inventories. Based on this review and subsequent discussions, the STRG panel made the following observations and recommendations:

1. The STRG was pleased to receive the reports from DOE about their plans for interim storage of plutonium and to also hear from the Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc., of Pantex about their plans for interim storage of plutonium both withdrawn from nuclear weapons and from accumulated stocks at the variety of DOE sites. The panel was concerned that the DOE is planning 50 years for an "interim" storage period. While this may be a conservative number, we hope that this figure will not detract from the sense of urgency to initiate and complete disposition of weapons grade plutonium in the U.S. and particularly in Russia, as the panel advised strongly in its previous reports.
   

   It appears to us that the total time to make decisions on the dispositions options to initiate and complete disposition of excess weapons plutonium should not be anywhere near as long as 50 years. We are including a table taken from the Report on Reactor Related Options annexed to the earlier reports on the Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium by the National Academy of Sciences which gives their estimates of the length of the plutonium disposition process, including the length of the actual disposition campaign. Disposition could be completed by the first decade of the next century.
   

2. The panel was interested in the studies which compared the attractiveness of upgrading U.S. storage facilities versus constructing a "grounds up" single storage facility. The panel was unpersuaded by the economic arguments supporting a single integrated facility. Proving that such new construction initiative is really economical is extremely difficult at this time for a number of reasons:
   
   1. Obtaining concurrence in the political process both for financing and site selection of a new major facility is difficult and may engender substantial delays, as has been demonstrated at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and the Yucca Mountain Project.
      

   2. Depending on the assumption about economic discount rates and on construction delays, there are substantial additional costs in financing a new construction initiative "up front" rather than gradually upgrading existing facilities.
      

   3. A multiplicity of sites offers greater flexibility to accommodate the changes in the amount of surplus plutonium which may, in fact, be declared by future administrations.
      

3. The panel heard the plans presented by Pantex management on concentrating its plutonium storage, which is now dispersed among a substantial number of igloos on the Pantex site, to a single large building in a different area. Again the panel found the argument for this move unpersuasive. The main reason given for the proposed move was a decrease in the annual costs of security and surveillance. Such figures by their nature are both small when compared to the total cost in this category at the Pantex plant, and they tend to be unreliable since they are embedded in a large overhead structure. The present arrangement offers substantial obvious security advantages due to the low technology nature of the security measures. Dispersed igloos with their heavy 40-ton concrete doors are unassailable clandestinely; you cannot sneak a crane or forklift across the open terrain at Pantex. The principal security hazard caused by the fact that Pantex lies in the approach pattern of the Amarillo airport appears to be relieved by the advanced stage of planning for shifting the approach to the airport. There is considerable advantage in "low-tech" measures for security; they are much less apt to lead to catastrophic failures since they are much less dependent on adequate maintenance of a high technology infrastructure.
   

   We were also impressed that the present arrangement at Pantex lends itself well to a separation of future storage facilities between those under multilateral (IAEA) or bilateral verification agreements, and those containing the strategic reserve. This seperation will be considerably more difficult if the intermediate storage arrangement and the other classified activities at Pantex are not as well separated.
   

4. The panel was concerned that in choosing among the DOE storage options, insufficient attention was given to anticipating a possible safeguards regime administered internationally (IAEA) or bilaterally with the Russians, as distinct from the need for storage for plutonium for the strategic reserve as designated by national policy. These two regimes of intermediate storage require different management approaches. The first has to be focused on transparency and absence of sensitive activities, the other has to be managed under conditions of appropriate classification safeguards. Moreover the magnitude of the strategic reserve is a very uncertain quantity. Currently that magnitude flows from the Nuclear Posture review conducted by DOD in November 1994 with its "reduce and hedge" philosophy. Future administrations may well revise the requirements for the strategic reserve dramatically up or down. Thus we advocate planning for both geographical and management separateness between the storage of plutonium declared surplus by the administration with an irreversible commitment of the material to non-military use, and the storage of the strategic reserve.
   

   The total quantity and physical and chemical form of material from sites other than Pantex is still quite uncertain and therefore planning should retain its flexibility, pending determination of the quality and quantity of the non-Pantex inventories.
   

5. The panel was pleased with and appreciated the presentations. In particular the presentation on the safe and secure transportation system reflected much thoughtful planning and execution. Also commendable are the reportedly effective efforts to reduce radiation dose to workers by the use of the robotics system in the plutonium storage process in the igloos.